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The 2014-2016 West African outbreak of Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) was
the largest and most deadly to date. Contact tracing, following up those
who may have been infected through contact with an infected individual to
prevent secondary spread, plays a vital role in controlling such outbreaks.
Our aim in this work was to mechanistically represent the contact tracing
process to illustrate potential areas of improvement in managing contact
tracing efforts. We also explored the role contact tracing played in eventually
ending the outbreak. We present a system of ordinary differential equations
to model contact tracing in Sierra Leonne during the outbreak. Using data
on cumulative cases and deaths we estimate most of the parameters in
our model. We include the novel features of counting the total number
of people being traced and tying this directly to the number of tracers
doing this work. Our work highlights the importance of incorporating
changing behavior into one’s model as needed when indicated by the data
and reported trends. Our results show that a larger contact tracing program
would have reduced the death toll of the outbreak. Counting the total
number of people being traced and including changes in behavior in our
model led to better understanding of disease management.
1 Introduction
In March 2014, the most deadly outbreak to date of Ebola virus disease
(EVD), a hemorrhagic fever, began in Guinea and rapidly spread to Liberia,
Nigeria, Senegal, and Sierra Leone [Frieden et al., 2014]. In October 2014, the
World Health Organization (WHO) Ebola Response Team estimated an over-
all case fatality rate of 70.8% and basic reproduction numbers (<0) of 1.71 for
Guinea, 1.83 for Libera and 1.38 for Sierra Leone [Aylward et al., 2014]. Concern
that Ebola might spread globally via airline travel led to recommendations
for health assessments at airports in the affected countries [Bogoch et al., 2015].
A review and meta-analysis of 31 reports found that the main methods of
spread were direct contact with an infected individual and contact with de-
ceased loved ones during traditional funeral practices [Brainard et al., 2016]. In
the 2014-2016 outbreak in Sierra Leone, among individuals confirmed to have
EVD, 47.9% reported that they had had contact with someone suspected of
having EVD and 25.5% reported having attended a funeral [Dietz et al., 2015].
These transmission pathways are further indicated as important by mathe-
matical models and by statistical models [Drake et al., 2015, Gomes et al., 2014,
Skrip et al., 2017, Li et al., 2017]. Ebola can survive on some surfaces for up
to 192 hours unless they are properly disinfected [Cook et al., 2015]. This
might be one of the reasons why so many health care workers became infected
[Senga et al., 2016]. Outcomes for individuals who contracted EVD during the
outbreak varied based on location, time of infection, and whether the individual
was hospitalized [Garske et al., 2017].
Contact tracing, sometimes called partner notification, is often used in the
fight against the spread of HIV [De Arazoza and Lounes, 2002, Hsieh et al., 2010,
Hyman et al., 2003]. Contact tracing for Ebola is quite different, though, because
it does not focus primarily on sexual partners but rather on people who have
been in some kind of close contact with the infected or deceased individual. The
goal of contact tracing is to identify secondary infections and to isolate them
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in order to stop disease transmission. Throughout the outbreak, the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention’s Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report
detailed the progress of the disease as well as some information about contact
tracing efforts. The ideal process for contact tracing is now described, though in
some cases it was altered due to constraints of geography, resource limitations,
or testing availability. Contacts were traced for 21 days after their last known
exposure to a confirmed, probable, or suspected case [CDC, 2014]. All contacts
being traced were instructed to remain isolated from the general population.
If a contact showed symptoms of EVD, they were moved to a suspected case
isolation ward and tested. If the test was positive, that individual was moved to
the confirmed case ward. If the test was negative the individual was sent home
to be traced for another 21 days.
Browne et al. built two models using data from Sierra Leone and Guinea
[Browne et al., 2015, Webb et al., 2015]. In their SEIR (Susceptible-Exposed-
Infectious-Recovered) model [Browne et al., 2015], they incorporated contact
tracing by building separate compartments for Exposed individuals and In-
fectious individuals being traced. Their model did not include spread within
hospitals and spread from contact with deceased individuals. They found that
increasing the fraction of cases reported and increasing the fraction of reported
contacts that were traced could bring <0 below 1. They also provided weekly
point estimates for the effective reproduction number for Guinea and Sierra
Leone. In this work, we will use a similar, but more mechanistic approach of
counting persons being traced and accounting for the workload of the contact
tracers.
Rivers et al. [Rivers et al., 2014] built an SEIR model of the epidemic in Sierra
Leone and Liberia while it was ongoing and before it had reached a peak. They
concluded that improved contact tracing could have a large impact on number
of cases but that even when combined with two other interventions contact
tracing was insufficient to bring the epidemic to an end. They identified the
duration of a traditional funeral in Sierra Leone as 4.5 days and the length of
the incubation period as 10 days, values which we use in our model.
In Sierra Leone, contact tracing was hampered by practical difficulties
[Stehling-Ariza et al., 2016]. Olu et al. analyzed contact tracing interview data
in the western area districts of Sierra Leone [Olu et al., 2016], and noted that
contact tracing was hindered by under-reporting of exposure, political difficul-
ties in hiring tracers, and an incomplete database for use of tracers. Contacts
being traced were supposed to be provided with basic needs, such as food
and water, but this often did not occur. Some contacts were difficult to trace
because of the stigma of being listed as a contact, and the average number of
contacts per case was only 8.5 which was lower than in comparable situations.
Olu et al. found that some people gave false information to tracers, withheld
information from tracers, and communities tended not to trust tracers. This
resulted in missed contacts. According to field staff (personal communication,
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention) [Washington, 2017], there were
difficulties in procuring additional people to perform contact tracing. In an
urban area a tracer could trace about 15 individuals per day, while in a rural
area a tracer could trace 10 individuals per day. In January 2015 there were
1200 contact tracers in Western Area, Sierra Leone. In neighboring Liberia,
tracers faced difficulty finding contacts, difficulty with completing all 21 days
of tracing, and resistance of symptomatic contacts to report to an Ebola Treat-
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ment Unit (ETU) [Wolfe et al., 2017]. Other challenges faced by contact tracers
in Liberia included contacts hiding from tracers, people failing to identify all
contacts or lying about their own exposure, resistance to in-home isolation, and
difficulties finding contact tracers. Many of the same problems were encoun-
tered in Sierra Leone. A study by Swanson et al. found that contact tracing
in Liberia was performed for 26.7% of cases and only identified 3.6% of new
cases [Swanson et al., 2018], suggesting room for improvement. Chowell and
Nishiura [Chowell and Nishiura, 2014] illustrated the insights for disease man-
agement that can come from modeling connected with Ebola epidemiological
data and discussed the need for understanding the effectiveness of contact
tracing.
Our goal was to carefully and mechanistically represent the contact tracing
process to illustrate potential areas of improvement in managing contact tracing
efforts. We explored the role contact tracing played in eventually ending the
outbreak. Our model uses a novel feature, which is explicitly counting the
people being traced and connecting the total persons traced with the workload
of contact tracer workers. We will focus our model on Sierra Leone, for which we
have data from the Sierra Leone Ministry of Health [sit, 2015, sit, 2016]. These
data include cumulative confirmed cases and cumulative confirmed deaths as
reported online during the outbreak in the daily situation report. We will design
a system of Ordinary Differential Equations (ODEs) explicitly incorporating
contact tracing, fit this model to our data, and see what insights we might gain
from this mechanistic approach.
2 Model
Our model is a compartmental model made up of a system of ODEs and fol-
lows an SEIR approach, similar to [Browne et al., 2015, Olu et al., 2016, Rivers et al., 2014,
Senga et al., 2017, Webb et al., 2015]. In addition to the Susceptible, Exposed,
Infected, and Recovered classes, we also include a class (D) to account for the
persons who have died from Ebola in the community (i.e., having not been
effectively isolated in a hospital or by other means), because they are a signif-
icant source of infection due to traditional funeral practices such as hugging
and kissing the body of a deceased loved one. We also include a Hospitalized
(H) class, in which individuals are assumed to be isolated and not contribute to
infection, and if they die their bodies are assumed to be disposed of safely. We
place no upper limit on the size of class H, which does not reflect the situation
during the outbreak where insufficient beds and staffing were a major limiting
factor in controlling the outbreak [Lokuge et al., 2016], but allows us to examine
the operation of a contact tracing system assuming hospital resources are readily
available.
Our investigation of contact tracing begins with adding two new classes of
individuals being traced. Since exposure is a hidden trait, individuals being
traced are either susceptible or exposed. We created a class called F of suscepti-
ble individuals who are being traced but will not become ill and a second class,
EF, for individuals being traced who are exposed and will become infectious.
Two events can lead to initiation of contact tracing: either an individual enters
the D class or an individual enters the H class. The contacts connected to the
individuals involved in either of these two events will be contacted each day
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Figure 1: Flow diagram with SEIR standard disease compartments, F, EF com-
partments due to contact tracing, and H, D for Hospitalized and Dead bodies
as appropriate for Ebola. The coefficients f represent transitions due to contact
tracing. The remaining parameters are defined in Table 1.
for 21 days by a contact tracer. We assume that individuals in the F class being
traced will follow isolation guidelines to prevent them from becoming exposed.
Individuals in EF are moved to the hospital when they present symptoms. The
function f alters the completion rate of key contact tracing steps based on the
amount of work to be done along with the number of available contact tracing
staff. There is a limited number of contact tracers, and each contact tracer is able
to trace a limited number of individuals at a time. To account for this, we place
a threshold on the total number of contacts that can be traced at a time. Part of
the work done by contact tracers is moving individuals to the hospital, and the
remaining effort is dedicated to visiting contacts who haven’t (yet) displayed
any symptoms of Ebola. In our flow diagram in figure 1 one can see the terms
with coefficients f representing the effects of contact tracing. Our model with
eight compartments is below:
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I′ = αE− f I
N
− γI − φ1 I − νI (5)
H′ = rEF + f
I
N
+ γI − φ2H − µH (6)
R′ = φ1 I + φ2H (7)
D′ = νI −ωD (8)
where N = S + E + I. The function f depends on F, EF, and I and gives the
rate of finding new contacts
f =
{
κ1γI + κ2νI if F + EF < (15)(1200)p
0 else
. (9)
Here 1− p is the proportion of the total available contact tracing effort dedicated
to hospitalizing individuals identified as symptomatic. Note that the two events
(movement into H and D) can be seen in the function f with the rates γI and νI.
In the cutoff for f , the number 15 is how many contacts on average one contact
tracer can trace and the number 1200 is the maximum number of contact tracers
that were employed in the Western Area, Sierra Leone (containing the capital
city of Freetown) during the 2014-2016 epidemic [Washington, 2017]. Although
the total number of contact tracers varied throughout the outbreak, we decided
to assume the maximum of 1200 were available throughout the outbreak. The
units of f are persons per day. The units of each compartment are individuals.
The units and interpretation of each parameter are listed in Table 1. Note that
we do not account for births or for deaths from any other cause than Ebola.
People can move from Susceptible to Exposed by coming into contact with
a member of the Infectious class (term β1SI) or by coming into contact with
an infectious dead body (term β2DS). People who are being traced move from
Susceptible to F or from Exposed to EF by coming into contact with a person
who has just been hospitalized or attending a funeral for somebody who has just
died of Ebola (term f SN = (κ1γI + κ2νI)
S
N ). This term is scaled by N because
the persons moving in tracing are moved proportionally to the ratio of persons
in their current class. For example, a person being traced from S moves to F
at a rate proportional to SN =
S
S+E+I . A person is more likely to be in EF while
being traced than to be in F because of the contact they had with either an
infected person or a dead body. To account for this, we multiply the term f EN by
a number q > 1, a scaling factor to increase the likelihood of E′Fs being traced
relative to that of F′s being traced. People who have completed their time being
traced and haven’t developed symptoms move back into S (term θF). Once a
person has been in the Exposed class for an average of 10 days, they move to
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Table 1: The parameters and compartment names in our model with their
interpretations and units.
Symbol Interpretation Units
β1 transmission from interactions between I and S per person per time
β2 transmission from interactions between D and S per person per time
1/θ number of days a person is traced time
1/α length of the exposed period time
r rate of hospitalization for traced individuals per time
γ rate of hospitalization for untraced individuals per time
φ1 recovery rate for untreated per time
φ2 recovery rate for treated per time
ν death rate for untreated per time
µ death rate for treated per time
ω rate at which dead bodies become non-infectious per time
κ1 contacts recruited from hospitalization of one person unitless
κ2 contacts recruited from funeral of one person unitless
q scaling factor for exposed contacts unitless
S susceptibles individuals
F susceptibles being traced individuals
E exposed individuals
EF exposed being traced individuals
I infectious individuals
H hospitalized individuals
D dead bodies individuals
R recovered individuals
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the Infectious class (term αE). A person in the class EF is moved to the hospital
once they develop symptoms (term rEF). If an individual being traced shows
symptoms the first time they are contacted, they are immediately moved to the
hospital (term f IN ). Some Infectious people decide to go to the hospital on their
own (term γI). Some Infectious people manage to survive Ebola and move to
R (term φ1 I) but others die of the disease and we assume they are not safely
buried and contribute to the class D (term νI). This is a simplifying assumption,
because as the epidemic drew on many people who died in the community
were safely buried. Some Hospitalized individuals will recover (term φ2H) but
others will die and be safely buried (term µH). After some time has passed, an
unsafely buried dead body is no longer able to infect people (with decay term
ωD).
3 Reproductive number
We will derive the basic reproductive number <0 using the standard method
of the Next Generation Matrix [Diekmann, 2000, Diekmann et al., 2012, van den Driessche and Watmough, 2002,
van den Driessche and Watmough, 2008]. We expect that near the disease free
equilibrium (DFE), the number of infections will be small but nonzero. The pop-
ulation affected by the outbreak consisted entirely of susceptibles at the begin-
ning of the outbreak. Therefore for this analysis we assume that f = κ1γI + κ2νI.
Now equation (7) implies
φ1 I∗ = −φ2H∗. (10)
Giving I∗ = H∗ = 0. From equation (8), we get D∗ = 0. Since I∗ = 0, equation
(2) gives F∗ = 0 and equation (5) gives E∗ = 0. Since I∗ = H∗ = 0, equation
(6) gives E∗F = 0. Since E
∗ = I∗ = 0, we conclude that S∗ = N(0). We have
the DFE: (S∗, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, R∗, 0). But we take R∗ = 0 for computation of the Next
Generation Matrix. The diseased classes here are: E, EF, I, H, and D, with









 , V =

αE + q(κ1γI + κ2νI) ES+I+E
rEF − q(κ1γI + κ2νI) ES+I+E
(φ1 + ν + γ)I + (κ1γI + κ2νI) IS+I+E − αE





It is easy to show that our model satisfies the assumptions required for use of
the Next Generation Method. Note that our DFE is not unique and this is not re-
quired. We get the Jacobian matrices DF (E, EF, I, H, D) and DV (E, EF, I, H, D)
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at the DFE, (0, 0, 0, 0, 0) with S = S∗,
DF (0, 0, 0, 0, 0) =

0 0 β1S∗ 0 β2S∗
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
 ,
DV (0, 0, 0, 0, 0) =

α 0 0 0 0
0 r 0 0 0
−α 0 φ1 + ν + γ 0 0
0 −r −γ φ2 + µ 0
0 0 −ν 0 ω
 .
Thus the basic reproductive number we obtain as the spectral radius of the
matrix DF (0, 0, 0, 0, 0)(DV )−1(0, 0, 0, 0, 0) is
<0 =
β1S∗
φ1 + ν + γ
+
νβ2S∗
ω(φ1 + ν + γ)
. (11)
The first term describes the number of new infections that we expect per in-
dividual from the I class, and the second term describes the number of new
infections that we expect per body in the D class.
4 Parameter estimation
Our data are taken from the Sierra Leone Ministry of Health daily situation
reports, published on their website during the epidemic. We accessed these
old web sites via the Wayback Machine at https://web.archive.org/web/
20150314233800/http:/health.gov.sl/?page_id=583 (28/02/2020). Data are
listed in Appendix A. Situation reports were available beginning at Day 77 with
the final day being Day 504, but not every intermediate day had a report. There
were 343 total reports available for us to use. From these reports we used con-
firmed cases and deaths. There was one report we chose to exclude because it
listed more confirmed deaths than subsequent reports, making our total number
of data points 342.
We chose some parameters from the literature and estimated others using








were taken from the literature [Rivers et al., 2014, CDC, 2014, Olu et al., 2016,
Senga et al., 2017]. Our data indicated that the initial condition for the H class
was H(0) = 94 individuals. We assumed the initial condition for the recovered
class was R(0) = 0 individuals, and that the initial condition for S was roughly
equivalent to the population of Sierra Leone at the time, S(0) = 6, 348, 350
people. We estimated the following parameters:
β1, β2, γ, κ1, κ2, r, p, ν, µ, φ1, φ2.
We estimated the following initial conditions:
F(0), E(0), EF(0), I(0), D(0).
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See Table 1 for parameter interpretations and units.
We estimated the above parameters in MATLAB using multistart to generate
many vectors of starting parameter estimates. Each vector was used to initialize
a search in fmincon, which is a local minimizer. In MATLAB ode45 served as
our ODE solver. Parameter upper and lower bounds were based on ranges
of parameters from the literature [Olu et al., 2016, Rivers et al., 2014] and from
our data. We used papers [Olu et al., 2016, Rivers et al., 2014] for some ranges
because they rely on data from Sierra Leone. For example, the upper bound
for F0 was taken as 2500 because our data indicated that in early days this was
roughly the number of contacts being traced. To estimate our cumulative simu-
lated cases, we summed over the entries into the H class, assuming that cases
for people in the community were unconfirmed. To estimate our cumulative
simulated deaths, we summed over the deaths from H and I together. The data
to be compared with simulation results are cumulative confirmed cases and













which is a type of sum of least squares for our model. Our data began at day 77
and ended at day 504 with 342 total data points each for cases and deaths. Note
that this does not include every day between day 77 and day 504. The missing
data are for days when the Ministry of Health situation report was unavailable.
The data from one day, when cumulative deaths were higher than for following
days, were excluded. You can see that some days do not have data by the gaps
in the red dots in Figure 2.
We had two primary goals during the process of parameter estimation:
1. Fit the data with a low J value
2. In each class we wanted reasonable dynamics, meaning approximately
the correct magnitude in the size of each compartment.
We tried several ways of fitting the data. First, we estimated all the param-
eters listed above, holding them all constant throughout the epidemic. This
resulted in simulated epidemic curves that did not flatten at the end, indicating
the epidemic would have kept going (see Appendix B). Then we chose five
parameters that seemed to vary during the epidemic according to the literature
and allowed those five parameters to switch from one value to a second value in
the middle of the epidemic with a smoothed transition between the two values.
In order to achieve a good simulation of the data with reasonable compartments,
we modified the model by inserting the parameter q. Then we reestimated the
parameters using the varying approach for five of the parameters. This resulted
in good simulations of the data with reasonable compartments.
In order to achieve a simulated fit of the data which would include a flatten-
ing of the cumulative cases and cumulative deaths curves, rather than simula-
tions which indicated the epidemic wouldn’t have ended, we decided to allow
some parameters (specifically β1, β2, γ, κ1, and κ2) to vary over the course of the
epidemic. We chose these parameters because we knew that people’s behavior
changed during the epidemic. We smoothed the transition from the first value
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of each of these parameters to the second value using piecewise functions such
as the one below for each of the parameters
β1(t) =

6.68e−8 t < 160





160 ≤ t ≤ 190
3.94e−8 t > 190.
(13)
Chowell et al. [Chowell et al., 2004] built a system of ODEs representing Ebola
outbreaks in Congo and Uganda and used a smooth transition between two
transmission rates due to control interventions (like education and contact
tracing followed by quarantine).
The literature supports our decision to allow β1, β2, γ, κ1 and κ2 to change
over the course of the epidemic. Senga et al. [Senga et al., 2017] analyzed data
on probable and confirmed cases of EVD and their contacts in Kenema district,
Sierra Leone taken from the national database. They found that the number
of contacts per case increased over time. The low number of contacts per case
reported early in the epidemic was much lower than those reported in other
countries, which they concluded meant that the contact listings were incom-
plete. Olu et al. found that during the months of June 2014 to November 2014
the average number of contacts per case was 9 and that during the months
of December 2014 to May 2015 the average number of contacts per case in-
creased to 16 [Olu et al., 2016]. Lokuge et al. reported that later in the epidemic
people were more likely to come to the hospital of their own volition, less
likely to report funeral contact, and that contact tracing increased in efficacy
[Lokuge et al., 2016]. These findings from the literature indicate it is reasonable
to conclude that values for β1, β2, γ, κ1 and κ2 changed during the course of the
epidemic due to changes in behavior and level of education in the population
about EVD.
However, we were unable to generate reasonable sizes for compartment
EF. Our simulations were showing very few people passing through EF, which
is not reflective of the success contact tracing achieved in locating exposed
individuals during the outbreak. We decided to modify the model by adding
a multiplier, q, in front of the f EN term. We tried several values and found
that a value of q = 100 generated reasonable sizes for compartment EF. This
multiplier indicates that people who were being traced had had contact with an
individual who was infectious or with a dead body, so they were more likely to
have been exposed to Ebola than a member of the population who hadn’t had
such contact. These changes resulted in the simulations shown in Figures 2, 3,
and 4 which were generated using the parameters found in Table 2.
Figure 3 shows how many cases total were identified as part of the contact
tracing effort. Near the end of the outbreak this number reaches about 1100,
which represents more than a tenth of all confirmed cases. This demonstrates the
importance of successful contact tracing. The peak of contact tracing numbers
corresponds to the slowing of the increase in cumulative cases, around day 200.
This indicates that contact tracing efforts contributed to ending the epidemic.
Note that in Figure 4 the increase later in the epidemic of S results from
people returning to S from F after being traced for 21 days and showing no
symptoms. In Figure 4, the peak in E occurs at day 164, the peak in H about
two weeks later on day 176, the peak in I about two weeks after that on day
192, and then the peak in D on day 197. It is not surprising that the peak in
11
Figure 2: The value of the objective for this simulation was J = 0.0423.
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Figure 3: Dynamics of class F in the upper left, class EF in the upper right, their
sum on the bottom left, and the integral of those leaving EF to be hospitalized
on the bottom right. These classes correspond to the parameters from Table 2
and the data simulations from Figure 2.
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Figure 4: The graphs above correspond to the parameters from Table 2 and the
data simulations from Figure 2. Note that the scales are all different.
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Table 2: Values for parameters, with five parameters having early and late
values. Parameters with ∗ were taken from the data or the literature. Others
were estimated.
Parameter Value Parameter Value
β1 early 1.00e−9 r 0.056
β1 late 1.00e−9 p 0.90
β2 early 1.00e−6 ν 0.024
β2 late 1.00e−7 µ 0.010
γ early 0.41 φ1 0.020
γ late 0.062 φ2 0.028
κ1 early 29.74 F(0) 2451.10
κ1 late 44.93 E(0) 32.04
κ2 early 44.62 EF(0) 124.88
κ2 late 16.61 I(0) 71.76
D(0) 6.09
α∗ 0.1 1/ω∗ 4.5
H(0)∗ 94 S(0)∗ 6, 348, 350
R(0)∗ 0 1/θ∗ 21
E precedes the other peaks, but it is surprising that the peak in D is the last
peak to occur. This indicates that there may have been unsafely buried bodies
later in the epidemic, but that fewer people were catching Ebola from funeral
interactions despite this increase in funerals.
In Table 2, there is no difference between β1 early and β1 late. However,
β2 changes from an early value of 1.00 ∗ 10−6 to a much lower later value of
1.00 ∗ 10−7. These parameter values indicate that while the rate of transmission
from interactions between S and I remained about the same throughout the
epidemic, the rate of transmission from D to S decreased dramatically as people
became more educated about Ebola. Oddly, γ = 0.41 decreases to a later value
of γ = 0.062, which does not agree with accounts from the literature that people
were more likely to come to the hospital once they developed symptoms later
in the epidemic than they were earlier in the epidemic. The value of κ1 = 29.74
early increases to κ1 = 44.93 late, corresponding to reports from the literature
that people were more likely to report more complete lists of contacts later in
the epidemic. However, κ2 = 44.62 early decreased to κ2 = 16.61 late, adding to
the conclusion that people were less likely to attend traditional funerals later in
the epidemic. The changes in these parameters during the outbreak might be
caused by a combination of factors including educating the public about Ebola
[Levy et al., 2017], increases in available beds at Ebola Treatment Centers, and
more effective implementation of contact tracing.
The value of r = 0.056 means that contacts who were infected took an
average of 18 days to show symptoms. This value for r is probably unrealistically
small, as it should likely be closer to α = 0.1. The parameter ν was slightly
larger than µ, since those who were treated had slightly lower chance of dying
from Ebola. Similarly, φ2 was larger than φ1 because those who were treated
were more likely to recover from the disease.
15
Figure 5: Effect of varying the number of contact tracers available from 0 to
2000, with 1200 as the corresponding number in our model.
5 Importance of contact tracing
Figure 5 shows potential trajectories for epidemics with different numbers
of contact tracer workers available, either more or fewer than were actually
available during the epidemic. We varied the number of these workers from 0
to 2000, and note that 1200 is the corresponding number in our model. Without
contact tracing at all, the highest blue curve, there would have been thousands
more cases and deaths. Even a much smaller work force than existed would
have made a dramatic improvement on the trajectory of the epidemic from what
would have happened without contact tracing. Once the number of contact
tracers reaches about 1000, each increase in the number of workers has much less
dramatic effects. More tracers still would have been better, but the difference in
trajectories is much less dramatic than the difference between 0 tracers and 200
tracers.
The number of persons traced from each hospitalization (κ1) and the number
16
Figure 6: Effect of varying contact tracing parameters κ1 and κ2 on the total
number of deaths by day 504 of the epidemic.
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from each funeral (κ2), were estimated as κ1 = 29.7 early, κ1 = 44.9 late, κ2 =
44.6 early, and κ2 = 16.6 late in our model. We vary those numbers from 5
to 50 to see the effect on the epidemic. If we hold each of the contact tracing
parameters κ1 and κ2 constant at the values in Figure 6, the heat map shows
the total number of deaths by day 504 of the outbreak. Increasing each of the
two parameters reduces the total number of deaths, but κ1 has a much more
dramatic effect than κ2. This seems to indicate that more deaths resulted from
people having contact with infected individuals than resulted from people
having contact with dead bodies.
6 Discussion and Conclusions
Better understanding of the mechanisms of contact tracing is important for
disease management. Our model is novel in its inclusion of explicit contact
tracing of both Susceptible and Exposed individuals as well as including the
limitation on the number of total contact tracers available for the work. We
counted the total number of people being traced and tracked the length of time
they were being traced. Li et al. analyzed 37 compartmental models of Ebola
[Li et al., 2017] and they identified models which explicitly included classes
of hospitalized individuals and of funerals as more useful to management
decisions, because they explicitly included targeted interventions. For this
reason, we explicitly included contact tracing in our model, including the
logistical limitations resulting from limited numbers of contact tracers, because
contact tracing is another targeted intervention.
We found that better matching of the simulations with the data was possible
when we allowed five parameters to change over the course of the epidemic:
β1, β2, γ, κ1 and κ2. These parameters are the per capita rate of transmission
from the Infectious compartment to the Susceptible compartment, the per capita
rate of transmission from the Dead body compartment to the Susceptible com-
partment, the rate of transition from the Infectious compartment to the Hospital
compartment, the number of contacts per person generated from a hospitalized
case, and the number of contacts per person generated from a funeral. These
parameters changed during the outbreak because more hospitals were avail-
able as the outbreak went on, people became more educated about the disease,
and contact tracing became more effective. This work illustrates the value of
changing parameters due to known behavior changes.
Early in the epidemic people were less likely to report as many contacts as
they did later in the epidemic, as demonstrated by the increase from κ1 = 29.74
early to κ1 = 44.93 late. Later in the epidemic people were less likely to attend
traditional funerals, as seen in the decrease from κ2 = 44.62 early to κ2 = 16.61
late. The transmission parameter β1 remained unchanged, while β2 decreased
from 1.00e−6 early to 1.00e−7 late.
There was a period when the contact tracing infrastructure was overwhelmed
by cases, as seen in the plateaus in Figures 4. More contact tracers available
to work would have prevented this plateau, but the number of contact tracers
available was sufficient to prevent many more cases and deaths from occur-
ring. Increasing either κ1 or κ2 would have decreased the number of deaths
that occurred, but κ1 had a stronger effect than κ2. Overall this work makes a
strong contribution to understanding the effects of contact tracing and changes
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in behavior on disease management.
In the future we plan to further explore the role of contact tracing in epi-
demics. To add international spread features, one could consider mobility data
[Halloran et al., 2014]. We plan to build a model with a more realistic form to
the function f which represents how contact tracing capacity grows in response
to an epidemic. We will also explore the role contact tracing plays in outbreaks
of other diseases, including diseases with a latent period such as COVID-19.
The mechanisms of contact tracing procedures for other disease might be quite
different and require the development of disease-specific models. Optimiza-
tion techniques (such as optimal control) could be used to design management
strategies for contact tracing.
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12-Aug-14 77 717 264 11-Feb-15 260 8183 3009 
13-Aug-14 78 733 273 12-Feb-15 261 8193 3018 
14-Aug-14 79 747 280 13-Feb-15 262 8208 3030 
15-Aug-14 80 757 287 14-Feb-15 263 8213 3036 
16-Aug-14 81 775 297 15-Feb-15 264 8226 3043 
17-Aug-14 82 778 305 16-Feb-15 265 8230 3050 
18-Aug-14 83 783 312 17-Feb-15 266 8237 3058 
19-Aug-14 84 804 320 18-Feb-15 267 8239 3063 
20-Aug-14 85 813 322 19-Feb-15 268 8244 3066 
21-Aug-14 86 823 329 20-Feb-15 269 8260 3079 
22-Aug-14 87 881 333 21-Feb-15 270 8275 3088 
23-Aug-14 88 904 336 22-Feb-15 271 8289 3095 
24-Aug-14 89 935 341 23-Feb-15 272 8301 3103 
25-Aug-14 90 955 355 24-Feb-15 273 8308 3113 
26-Aug-14 91 961 363 25-Feb-15 274 8320 3124 
27-Aug-14 92 988 372 27-Feb-15 276 8349 3151 
28-Aug-14 93 1018 377 28-Feb-15 277 8353 3164 
29-Aug-14 94 1033 383 1-Mar-15 278 8370 3180 
30-Aug-14 95 1077 387 2-Mar-15 279 8374 3188 
31-Aug-14 96 1106 388 3-Mar-15 280 8383 3199 
1-Sep-14 97 1115 396 4-Mar-15 281 8389 3210 
2-Sep-14 98 1146 399 5-Mar-15 282 8398 3222 
3-Sep-14 99 1174 404 7-Mar-15 284 8416 3245 
5-Sep-14 101 1234 413 8-Mar-15 285 8428 3263 
6-Sep-14 102 1276 426 9-Mar-15 286 8444 3279 
7-Sep-14 103 1287 428 10-Mar-15 287 8463 3289 
8-Sep-14 104 1305 433 11-Mar-15 288 8469 3297 
9-Sep-14 105 1341 436 12-Mar-15 289 8472 3303 
10-Sep-14 106 1367 445 13-Mar-15 290 8476 3312 
11-Sep-14 107 1401 450 15-Mar-15 292 8487 3325 
12-Sep-14 108 1432 459 16-Mar-15 293 8501 3327 
13-Sep-14 109 1464 463 17-Mar-15 294 8502 3336 
14-Sep-14 110 1513 468 19-Mar-15 296 8508 3360 
15-Sep-14 111 1542 474 20-Mar-15 297 8515 3370 
16-Sep-14 112 1571 483 21-Mar-15 298 8518 3376 
17-Sep-14 113 1585 489 22-Mar-15 299 8520 3381 
18-Sep-14 114 1618 495 23-Mar-15 300 8528 3393 
19-Sep-14 115 1640 497 24-Mar-15 301 8529 3398 
20-Sep-14 116 1696 501 25-Mar-15 302 8532 3407 
21-Sep-14 117 1745 502 26-Mar-15 303 8535 3413 
22-Sep-14 118 1775 506 27-Mar-15 304 8539 3421 
23-Sep-14 119 1816 509 29-Mar-15 306 8545 3433 
24-Sep-14 120 1885 509 31-Mar-15 308 8547 3444 
25-Sep-14 121 1920 513 1-Apr-15 309 8549 3448 
26-Sep-14 122 1944 513 2-Apr-15 310 8549 3454 
27-Sep-14 123 2000 518 3-Apr-15 311 8551 3459 
28-Sep-14 124 2090 522 4-Apr-15 312 8555 3461 
29-Sep-14 125 2155 527 5-Apr-15 313 8555 3466 
30-Sep-14 126 2184 550 6-Apr-15 314 8558 3472 
1-Oct-14 127 2212 532 7-Apr-15 315 8558 3475 
3-Oct-14 129 2276 538 8-Apr-15 316 8559 3476 
4-Oct-14 130 2411 678 9-Apr-15 317 8560 3481 
5-Oct-14 131 2459 699 10-Apr-15 318 8560 3488 
6-Oct-14 132 2504 703 11-Apr-15 319 8561 3490 
7-Oct-14 133 2585 708 12-Apr-15 320 8563 3491 
8-Oct-14 134 2593 713 13-Apr-15 321 8565 3496 
10-Oct-14 136 2698 904 14-Apr-15 322 8566 3499 
11-Oct-14 137 2792 921 15-Apr-15 323 8569 3499 
12-Oct-14 138 2849 926 16-Apr-15 324 8571 3503 
13-Oct-14 139 2894 931 17-Apr-15 325 8572 3506 
14-Oct-14 140 2977 932 18-Apr-15 326 8573 3508 
15-Oct-14 141 3003 943 19-Apr-15 327 8573 3511 
16-Oct-14 142 3058 947 20-Apr-15 328 8580 3516 
17-Oct-14 143 3097 954 21-Apr-15 329 8581 3519 
18-Oct-14 144 3154 973 22-Apr-15 330 8584 3520 
19-Oct-14 145 3223 986 23-Apr-15 331 8585 3526 
20-Oct-14 146 3295 997 24-Apr-15 332 8585 3526 
21-Oct-14 147 3345 1001 25-Apr-15 333 8585 3529 
22-Oct-14 148 3389 1008 26-Apr-15 334 8586 3533 
23-Oct-14 149 3449 1012 27-Apr-15 335 8587 3534 
24-Oct-14 150 3490 1026 29-Apr-15 337 8590 3535 
25-Oct-14 151 3560 1037 30-Apr-15 338 8591 3535 
26-Oct-14 152 3622 1044 2-May-15 340 8592 3536 
27-Oct-14 153 3713 1049 3-May-15 341 8595 3537 
28-Oct-14 154 3760 1057 4-May-15 342 8597 3538 
30-Oct-14 156 3841 1064 5-May-15 343 8597 3538 
31-Oct-14 157 3936 1070 6-May-15 344 8597 3538 
1-Nov-14 158 3996 1077 7-May-15 345 8597 3538 
2-Nov-14 159 4057 1085 8-May-15 346 8597 3538 
6-Nov-14 163 4232 1114 9-May-15 347 8597 3538 
7-Nov-14 164 4277 1126 10-May-15 348 8597 3538 
8-Nov-14 165 4433 1133 12-May-15 350 8597 3538 
10-Nov-14 167 4617 1149 13-May-15 351 8598 3538 
12-Nov-14 169 4744 1169 15-May-15 353 8601 3539 
13-Nov-14 170 4828 1180 17-May-15 355 8605 3541 
14-Nov-14 171 4913 1196 18-May-15 356 8606 3541 
15-Nov-14 172 4967 1206 19-May-15 357 8607 3541 
16-Nov-14 173 5056 1223 20-May-15 358 8608 3541 
17-Nov-14 174 5109 1233 21-May-15 359 8608 3542 
18-Nov-14 175 5152 1240 22-May-15 360 8608 3542 
19-Nov-14 176 5210 1249 23-May-15 361 8608 3542 
20-Nov-14 177 5304 1282 24-May-15 362 8608 3542 
21-Nov-14 178 5355 1303 25-May-15 363 8608 3543 
22-Nov-14 179 5402 1333 26-May-15 364 8611 3545 
23-Nov-14 180 5441 1364 27-May-15 365 8614 3545 
24-Nov-14 181 5524 1397 28-May-15 366 8616 3545 
25-Nov-14 182 5595 1429 29-May-15 367 8617 3545 
26-Nov-14 183 5683 1464 30-May-15 368 8618 3545 
27-Nov-14 184 5767 1481 31-May-15 369 8619 3546 
28-Nov-14 185 5831 1496 1-Jun-15 370 8620 3546 
29-Nov-14 186 5906 1522 2-Jun-15 371 8623 3546 
30-Nov-14 187 5978 1549 3-Jun-15 372 8624 3546 
1-Dec-14 188 6039 1575 4-Jun-15 373 8626 3546 
2-Dec-14 189 6132 1601 5-Jun-15 374 8628 3547 
4-Dec-14 191 6238 1648 6-Jun-15 375 8630 3547 
5-Dec-14 192 6292 1669 8-Jun-15 377 8636 3549 
6-Dec-14 193 6317 1708 11-Jun-15 380 8647 3551 
7-Dec-14 194 6375 1734 1-Jul-15 400 8671 3569 
8-Dec-14 195 6420 1786 3-Jul-15 402 8672 3572 
9-Dec-14 196 6457 1823 4-Jul-15 403 8673 3574 
10-Dec-14 197 6497 1865 5-Jul-15 404 8674 3574 
11-Dec-14 198 6557 1910 6-Jul-15 405 8674 3574 
12-Dec-14 199 6592 1952 7-Jul-15 406 8675 3575 
13-Dec-14 200 6638 1999 9-Jul-15 408 8679 3575 
14-Dec-14 201 6702 2051 10-Jul-15 409 8686 3578 
15-Dec-14 202 6757 2076 11-Jul-15 410 8687 3580 
16-Dec-14 203 6808 2095 12-Jul-15 411 8688 3581 
17-Dec-14 204 6856 2111 13-Jul-15 412 8688 3582 
18-Dec-14 205 6903 2136 15-Jul-15 414 8690 3582 
19-Dec-14 206 6932 2163 16-Jul-15 415 8690 3582 
20-Dec-14 207 6975 2190 17-Jul-15 416 8691 3582 
21-Dec-14 208 7017 2216 18-Jul-15 417 8692 3583 
22-Dec-14 209 7075 2235 19-Jul-15 418 8692 3583 
23-Dec-14 210 7130 2273 20-Jul-15 419 8694 3583 
24-Dec-14 211 7160 2289 21-Jul-15 420 8694 3583 
25-Dec-14 212 7220 2319 23-Jul-15 422 8694 3583 
26-Dec-14 213 7275 2345 24-Jul-15 423 8695 3584 
27-Dec-14 214 7326 2366 25-Jul-15 424 8695 3585 
28-Dec-14 215 7354 2392 27-Jul-15 426 8695 3585 
29-Dec-14 216 7419 2410 29-Jul-15 428 8695 3585 
30-Dec-14 217 7458 2435 31-Jul-15 430 8694 3585 
31-Dec-14 218 7476 2461 1-Aug-15 431 8695 3585 
1-Jan-15 219 7505 2501 2-Aug-15 432 8695 3585 
2-Jan-15 220 7542 2524 3-Aug-15 433 8695 3585 
3-Jan-15 221 7572 2550 4-Aug-15 434 8696 3585 
4-Jan-15 222 7606 2578 5-Aug-15 435 8696 3585 
5-Jan-15 223 7641 2607 7-Aug-15 437 8697 3585 
6-Jan-15 224 7665 2612 9-Aug-15 439 8697 3585 
7-Jan-15 225 7696 2630 11-Aug-15 441 8697 3585 
8-Jan-15 226 7718 2650 12-Aug-15 442 8697 3586 
9-Jan-15 227 7749 2663 13-Aug-15 443 8697 3586 
10-Jan-15 228 7777 2684 14-Aug-15 444 8697 3586 
11-Jan-15 229 7797 2697 15-Aug-15 445 8697 3586 
12-Jan-15 230 7816 2702 16-Aug-15 446 8697 3586 
13-Jan-15 231 7839 2718 17-Aug-15 447 8697 3586 
14-Jan-15 232 7855 2732 18-Aug-15 448 8697 3586 
15-Jan-15 233 7861 2742 19-Aug-15 449 8697 3586 
16-Jan-15 234 7885 2760 20-Aug-15 450 8697 3586 
17-Jan-15 235 7897 2767 23-Aug-15 453 8697 3586 
18-Jan-15 236 7917 2780 24-Aug-15 454 8697 3586 
19-Jan-15 237 7923 2788 25-Aug-15 455 8697 3586 
20-Jan-15 238 7935 2794 26-Aug-15 456 8697 3586 
21-Jan-15 239 7944 2802 27-Aug-15 457 8697 3586 
22-Jan-15 240 7958 2814 31-Aug-15 461 8698 3587 
23-Jan-15 241 7966 2822 2-Sep-15 463 8698 3587 
24-Jan-15 242 7977 2830 3-Sep-15 464 8698 3587 
25-Jan-15 243 7982 2834 7-Sep-15 468 8702 3587 
26-Jan-15 244 7991 2842 12-Sep-15 473 8703 3587 
27-Jan-15 245 8003 2851 13-Sep-15 474 8704 3587 
28-Jan-15 246 8015 2859 16-Sep-15 477 8704 3589 
29-Jan-15 247 8033 2873 17-Sep-15 478 8704 3589 
31-Jan-15 249 8056 2909 19-Sep-15 480 8704 3589 
1-Feb-15 250 8073 2911 20-Sep-15 481 8704 3589 
2-Feb-15 251 8077 2921 21-Sep-15 482 8704 3589 
3-Feb-15 252 8098 2936 25-Sep-15 486 8704 3589 
4-Feb-15 253 8111 2949 26-Sep-15 487 8704 3589 
5-Feb-15 254 8117 2950 29-Sep-15 490 8704 3589 
6-Feb-15 255 8124 2959 4-Oct-15 495 8704 3589 
7-Feb-15 256 8136 2971 5-Oct-15 496 8704 3589 
8-Feb-15 257 8149 2978 6-Oct-15 497 8704 3589 
10-Feb-15 259 8169 2998 13-Oct-15 504 8704 3589 
 
B Initial Fitting Results
Figure 7: First attempt match to the data of cumulative cases and cumulative
deaths with all parameters constant. The value of J is 0.1963.
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